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COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. GLEAVE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a 
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellants 
and Respondents, 
and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
SIXTH MEMORANDUM OF 
NEWLY UNCOVERED 
AUTHORITY 
Case No. 20166 &b0O5"l~C4\ 
Case No. 20300 8b0O58-CA 
Consolidated 
Case No. 20300 
Category No. 13b 
The Brief of Appellant at Point III argues that the 
State of Utah has exclusive jurisdiction (or preemption) over 
the installation of signals at railroad crossings. The 
response to that argument is found at Point III and Exhibit C 
of Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant Robert L. 
Gleave. 
Although plaintiff has filed six memoranda, these 
memoranda generally deal with cases which did not exist when 
the original brief was written. 
With respect to those arguments, Gleave cites the 
additional authority of Bonnie Chloe Wilde v. Denver and Ric 
Grande Western R. R. Co. (opinion attached). This is an 
unpublished opinion of a federal trial court. However, the 
issues are identical. 
In Wilde, the Denver & Rio Grande argued (as they did 
in Gleave that: 
The defendant [Denver & Rio Grande] argues 
strenuously that it cannot be found negli-
gent for failing to do something the law 
prohibits it from doing. The railroad 
relies on this court's conclusion of law in 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. 
West Jordan Municipal Corporation, 
C-82-344J,judgment entered May 28, 1982. 
In that case, this court concluded that the 
State of Utah has given the Utah department 
of transportation the exclusive authority 
"to determine, prescribe, and allocate the 
costs of protecting railroad grade cross-
ings within the State of Utah." Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p.6, filed 
May 28, 1982. This court also concluded 
that the laws of the State of Utah preempt 
any attempt by a municipality to add 
additional warnings at grade crossings. 
From this, the railroad concludes that it 
is prohibited from installing warning 
devices at grade crossings without an order 
from the department of transportation. 
(Slip Opinion at p.9 and 10.) 
Judge Jenkins disposed of that argument summarily: 
The Court does not need to reach the merits 
of the railroad's contention. Even assum-
ing that the railroad cannot install 
warnings at grade crossings without an 
express order from the department of 
transportation, the railroad nevertheless 
is not relieved of its duty to operate its 
trains with reasonable care. If a crossing 
is more than ordinarily hazardous, the 
railroad cannot simply ignore that fact and 
put the public in peril until the depart-
ment of transportation acts. Until the 
department acts, the reasonable care 
2 
standard requires the railroad to take 
other measures to reduce the risks of a 
crossing commensurate with the risks it 
imposes on the public. These measures may 
include posting a flagman, slowing down its 
trains, or perhaps stopping service through 
a crossing altogether if there is no other 
way to satisfy the reasonable care 
standard. 
It should be noted that, in Gleave, the Denver & 
Rio Grande relies upon Judge Jenkins decision in Denver & 
Rio Grande v. West Jordan Municipal Corp.. (See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 33 n.3 and Exhibit R.) However, Denver & Rio 
Grande failed to disclose that the very same Judge (Jenkins) 
specifically distinguished the West Jordan case in the later 
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Wilde case (quoted supra). 
Therefore, it appears that the law firm of 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy is in direct violation 
of DR7-106(B)(1) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah Bar: 
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a 
lawyer shall disclose . . . legal authority 
in the controlling jurisdiction known to 
him to be directly adverse to the position 
of his client and which is not disclosed by 
opposing counsel. 
DATED this 2md day of ^/tl^^i^^ , 198^. 
ROBERT7J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Robert Gleave 
Grande wrote its opening brief, but before Denver & Rio 
Grande filed its reply brief. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Sixth Memorandum of Newly Uncovered Authority, 
(Gleave vs. Denver & Rio Grande vs. State of Utah), was mailed 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ^Lr><^/ day of 
l^yuiCikjJ t 198^ $, to the following: 
E. Scott Savage, Esq. 
Michael F. Richman, Esq. 
Patrick J. O'Hara, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Attorneys for the Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company and Utah 
Railway Company 
50 South Main Street, Suite 16 00 
P. 0. Box 3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400 
Paul Warner, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah 
Department of Transportation, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DI STRUCK OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
BONNIE CHLOE WILDE, 
individually; BONNIE CHLOE 
WILDE as natural parent and 
legal guardian of RYAN GEORGE 
WILDE, RANDALL LEVERRE WILDE, 
and RUSSELL ORVIN WILDE; and 
BONNIE CHLOE WILDE as 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of GARTH LYNN 
WILDE, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs, 
V • 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant and 
Counterclaimant, 
v • 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE AND THE HEIRS OF 
GARTH LYNN WILDE, 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
C-83-149J 
This matter came before the court on the defendant's motion 
for partial summary judgment. It raises three issues: (1) 
Whether a railroad has a common law duty to install additional 
warning devices at a railroad grade crossing that is more than 
ordinarily dangerous; (2) Whether the particular railroad 
crossing involved in this lawsuit is, as a matter of law, no more 
hazardous than ordinarily hazardous; and (3) Whether Garth 
FILE COPY 
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Wilde, the driver of the car and the plaintiffs' deceased husband 
and father, was negligent as a matter of law. 
On June 22, 1984, the court heard oral arguments on the 
motion. Lynn C. Harris, Allen K. Young, and Edward P. Moriarity 
appeared for the plaintiffs. E. Scott Savage and David J. Jordan 
appeared for the defendant. At that time, the court reserved 
ruling on the motion. After considering the oral arguments and 
the extensive memoranda and affidavits filed by the parties, the 
court now enters this memorandum opinion. 
This litigation arose from an accident between the 
defendant's train and the automobile in which the plaintiffs were 
riding. After resolving all questions of fact in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the undisputed facts for the purpose of this motion 
are as follows. The accident occured at a railroad crossing on 
700 South Street in Springville, Utah. 700 South runs east to 
west, and the defendant's tracks run southeast to northwest. At 
approximately 170 West on 700 South, the defendant's tracks 
intersect 700 South at a 44 degree angle. A driver westbound on 
700 South would have to turn his head and look behind him to be 
able to see a northwesterly bound train overtaking him from the 
rear. 
Approximately 35 feet south of 700 South and 120 feet east 
of the crossing, a triplex temporarily blocks the view of a 
driver westbound on 700 South so that he cannot see a 
northwesterly bound train overtaking him until he passes the 
triplex. However, at a point about 50 feet from the crossing, a 
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westbound driver's view of the tracks is unobstructed for at 
least 500 feet. 
The crossing itself is marked with the familiar white 
crossbuck "Railroad Crossing" warning sign on a white post. In 
1976, the defendant received permission from the City of 
Springville to attach a stop sign to the white post directly 
beneath the crossbuck. The stop sign itself is 42 inches above 
the ground. The two signs are situated 11 feet north of 700 
South and 14 feet northeast of the tracks. Because of the acute 
angle that the tracks intersect the road, a westbound car that 
stops at a point even with the two signs could protrude up to 2 
1/2 feet onto the tracks even if the car remains on the right 
half of the road. 
About thirty yards west of the crossing a second set of 
tracks intersects 700 South. That crossing is marked with a 
standard crossbuck sign, as well as with a stop sign attached to 
a power pole to the right of the crossbuck. 
At 9:00 in the morning on February 10, 1981, Garth Wilde was 
driving his family station wagon westbound on 700 South. His 
wife and three of his four children were riding with him. 
Although the air was clear, the road was covered with snow and 
was extremely slick. At that time, a train was approaching from 
the northeast on the second set of tracks. Garth Wilde attempted 
to stop his automobile, which slid on the icy road until it came 
to a stop on the first set of tracks. Bonnie Wilde stated in her 
deposition that as soon as the train on the second set of tracks 
had cleared the intersection, she looked to the left to see why 
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her husband had not begun to drive. Immediately as she looked to 
her left, a train approaching from the southwest collided with 
their family car, killing Garth Wilde and one of the children. 
See Deposition of Bonnie Chloe Wilde at p. 37. Bonnie Wilde and 
the two children with her who survived sustained physical 
injuries. It is not clear whether Garth Wilde attempted to stop 
because he saw the train on the second set of tracks, because he 
saw the train on the first set of tracks, or because he saw the 
stop sign and the crossbuck. 
The train involved in the accident was travelling at least 
40 miles per hour. The engineer has testified that as soon as it 
became apparent that a collision was imminent, he attempted to 
stop the train. See Deposition of Ray C. Brown, pp. 97-98. 
Bonnie Wilde and her three surviving children brought this 
action in state court claiming damages both for personal injury 
and for wrongful death. The action is footed on a negligence 
theory. Specifically, they assert that the railroad failed to 
blow a whistle, ring a bell, or otherwise warn motorists that a 
train was approaching. They also assert that the railroad knew 
the crossing was "extrahazardous" and that the railroad breached 
a duty to erect additional warnings commensurate with the 
extrahazardous nature of the crossing. Finally, they assert that 
the railroad operated its train at an excessive rate of speed, 
that the railroad failed to stop its train to avoid the accident, 
and that the railroad failed to maintain its equipment in proper 
repair to be able to avoid the accident. 
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After removing the case to federal court, the defendant 
railroad answered the complaint and counterclaimed against the 
personal representative of the estate of Garth Wilde, The 
railroad asserts that Garth Wilde was negligent and that his 
negligence was a cause of the accident. 
In its motion for partial summary judgment, the defendant 
railroad asks this court to rule as a matter of law that the 
railroad has no duty to supplement warnings at a grade crossing 
that is more than ordinarily hazardous. It also asks the court 
to rule as a matter of law that the crossing involved in this 
case was no more hazardous than ordinarily hazardous. Finally, 
it asks the court to rule as a matter of law that Garth Wilde was 
negligent and that his negligence was a cause of the accident.! 
I. 
The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that a railroad has 
an independent duty to install additional warning devices at a 
grade crossing that is more than ordinarily dangerous. They 
claim that a failure to install such warning devices is a breach 
of that duty. They further claim that if an injury proximately 
results from that breach, the railroad is liable to pay damages.2 
1 The railroad has also asked this court to rule as a matter 
of law that Garth Wilde's negligence was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident. The court does not find it necessary to reach 
this issue. 
2 Paragraph 8(c) of the complaint provides as follows: 
Defendant had an independent duty to 
maintain said crossing in a safe and reasonable 
manner and did maintain said intersection without 
any warning, bell, gong, signal, or device, 
flasher system, or any method to warn the 
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The defendant railroad argues in its Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment that the Utah legislature abolished the 
independent duty to install warnings when it passed section 
54-4-15.1 of the Utah Code.3 The railroad argues that section 
54-4-15.1 gives the department of transportation exclusive 
authority to install warnings at grade crossings, and, therefore, 
the railroad no longer has that duty. 
The plaintiffs argue that section 54-4-15.1 does not give 
exclusive authority to the department of transportation to 
install warning devices, and that section 54-4-15.1 did not 
abrogate the railroad's independent duty to install adequate 
oncoming traffic, and more particularly the above 
named plaintiffs, of the approach of any of its 
trains at any time, and more particularly on 
February 10, 1981. Defendant knew, or in the 
exercise of ordinary prudence and care should 
have known, that said crossing being wholly 
unprotected would constitute a menace, hazard, 
and a danger to persons, and would be an 
ultrahazardous crossing to persons, and more 
particularly the above named plaintiffs, who 
might be traveling along 700 South near said 
railroad crossing. 
Complaint, 1 8(c), filed January 27, 1983. 
3 Section 54-4-15.1 provides as follows: 
The department of transportation so as to promote 
the public safety shall as prescribed in this act provide 
for the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and 
improving of automatic and other safety appliances, 
signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways 
or roads over the tracks of any railroad or street 
railroad corporation in this state. 
54-4-15.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
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warnings at a grade crossing that is more than ordinarily 
dangerous. 
The arguments of both parties are misplaced. Under Utah 
law, a railroad has no independent duty to install warning 
devices at a grade crossing that is more than ordinarily 
dangerous.4 A railroad does have a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in the operation of its trains to avoid injuring the public. 
English v. Southern Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47, 50. 
(1896). The Utah Supreme Court has held as a matter of law that 
a railroad does not breach that duty by operating a train through 
a grade crossing without first taking additional precautions so 
long as the crossing is not "more than ordinarily hazardous.11 
Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 P.2d 
738, 739 (1971). See also English, 45 P. at 50. However, 
neither English nor Bridges establishes an independent duty to 
erect warnings at a crossing that is more than ordinarily 
hazardous.5 See also Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
^ The plaintiffs do not point to a statute that imposes such a 
duty. Section 56-1-11 of the Utah Code provides that a "railroad 
company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to make 
and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any 
line of travel crosses its road." However, the Utah cases that 
rely on this section find the railroad liable for negligence in 
failing to maintain the crossing itself, not for failing to erect 
warnings. See Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 
P. 999, 1007-TJ3 (1913) (public road below the elevation of the 
tracks; no fill between the rails); cf. Van Wagoner v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 112 Utah 218, TE6 P.2d 293,"" 304 (1947). 
5 Some of the language in English could be interpreted to mean 
that an independent duty is imposed on a railroad to post a 
flagman or install additional warning devices to mark a grade 
crossing that: is more than ordinarily dangerous. For example, 
the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
The second matter of negligence that is allege 
is a failure to provide a switchman or flagman at 
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Railroad, 677 P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, there 
was no common law duty for the legislature to abolish when it 
enacted section 54-4-15.1. 
Not only are the parties1 arguments with regard to the 
so-called independent duty to erect warnings contrary to Utah 
law, the parties1 focus on that duty is also misleading. The 
mischief that causes the harm at a grade crossing is not a 
failure to install flashing lights or a gate, for such a failure, 
standing alone, can never cause an injury. The mischief that 
causes the harm at a grade crossing is the negligent operation of 
a train. Until a railroad sends one of its trains down the 
tracks and through a crossing, the public is not in danger 
regardless of how hazardous that crossing might be. But when a 
railroad undertakes to operate a train through a grade crossing, 
the railroad has a duty to do so through the exercise reasonable 
care to avoid injuring the public. 
The Bridges and English cases must be read in light of the 
railroad's duty. They do not alter that duty, and they do not 
add to it.^ They merely stand for the proposition that, as a 
the crossing, or to provide gates which should be 
closed and opened, so as to prevent passengers 
upon the highway from being exposed to danger. 
The plaintiffs claim that under the facts and 
circumstances developed in this case, that this 
became a duty which the defendants owed to the 
traveling public. 
45 P. at 49. However, a careful reading of the rest of the 
instruction, in addition to the other parts of the opinion, 
indicates that the court did not intend to create a separate, 
independent duty. 
6
 Hickman v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 136, 213 
P.2d F507 b^A (l^^U), states that EngIisTT"indicates that the 
duty where trains cross highways may be increased, depending on 
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matter of law, a railroad does not breach that duty by running a 
train through a grade crossing without first taking additional 
precautions so long as the grade crossing is not more than 
ordinarily dangerous. In other words, the Utah Court has 
determined as a matter of law that unless conditions at the 
crossing "render the warning employed at the crossing . . . 
inadequate to warn the public of danger,tf a reasonable person 
would not erect additional warnings before operating a train 
through that crossing. Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739, However, if a 
fact finder determines that the conditions around the grade 
crossing do "render the warning employed at the crossing . . . 
inadequate to warn the public of danger," the fact finder is then 
in the position to determine whether the railroad exercised 
reasonable care in running a train through that crossing without 
taking further precautions. I^ d. See also Hickman v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 136, 213 P.2d 650, 654 (1950); 
English, 45 P. at 50. 
The defendant argues strenuously that it cannot be found 
negligent for failing to do something the law prohibits it from 
doing.7 The railroad relies on this court's conclusion of law 
the locality and traffic." Actually, the duty always remains the 
same: The railroad must do what a reasonable man would do under 
similar circumstances. However, what a reasonable man would do 
changes as the circumstances change. In that sense, a railroad's 
duty may be increased or decreased by the circumstances. 
7
 The defendant also asserts that the court should follow the 
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Penn v. Burlington Northern, 
Inc., 185 Mont. 223, 605 P.2d 600 (19WT—HTtfiTt case,TF£ 
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the trial court was correct in 
refusing to charge the jury that the railroad was negligent per 
se for failing to install the type of warnings the Manual on 
Traffic Control Devices required at extrahazardous crossings: 
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in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. West Jordan 
Municipal Corporation, C-82-344J, judgment entered May 28, 1982.8 
In that case, this court concluded that the State of Utah has 
given the Utah department of transportation the exclusive 
authority flto determine, prescribe, and allocate the costs of 
protecting railroad grade crossings within the State of Utah.11 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 6, filed May 28, 
1982. This court also concluded that the laws of the State of 
Utah preempt any attempt by a municipality to add additional 
warnings at grade crossings. From this, the railroad concludes 
that it is prohibited from installing warning devices at grade 
crossings without an order from the department of transportation. 
[I]n Montana, the Manual does not have equal 
dignity with statutory law. There must be 
evidence that the Highway Commission directed the 
installation of additional warning signals before 
Burlington Northern can be charged with a duty to 
make such installations. 
Id. at 604. Based on these conclusions, the Montana court held 
TFat the railroad could not be found negligent per se for failing 
to erect warnings it had not been ordered to erect. It did not 
hold that a jury could not consider the lack of additional 
warnings in determining whether the railroad exercised reasonable 
care when it ran a train through a crossing that was more than 
ordinarily hazardous. Accordingly, Perm is inapposite. 
8 The railroad also points the court to two orders granting 
partial summary judgment entered by other judges in this 
district. Harsin v. Denver Se Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 
C-83-0993W (D. Utah, order entered January 10, 10fl5; Bellon v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., C-83-888A (D. Utah, 
order entered September 10, 19#4). Both of those orders conclude 
that the authority to install warning devices at railroad grade 
crossings is vested exclusively in the department of 
transportation, and, therefore, as a matter of law, a railroad 
cannot be found negligent for failing to install additional 
warning devices. Because this court's analytical framework is 
different from that used by the other courts in this district, 
those conclusions are not dispositive. 
-11- C-83-149J 
The court does not need to reach the merits of the 
railroad's contention. Even assuming that the railroad cannot 
install warnings at grade crossings without an express order from 
the department of transportation, the railroad nevertheless is 
not relieved of its duty to operate its trains with reasonable 
care. If a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, the 
railroad cannot simply ignore that fact and put the public in 
peril until the department of transportation acts. Until the 
department acts, the reasonable care standard requires the 
railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a crossing 
commensurate with the risks it imposes on the public. These 
measures may include posting a flagman, slowing down its trains, 
or perhaps stopping service through a crossing altogether if 
there is no other way to satisfy the reasonable care standard. 
II. 
The second issue presented by the defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is whether the grade crossing involved 
in this case is, as a matter of law, merely ordinarily hazardous. 
Because this is a question of fact, the court, after examining 
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, 
may resolve the question against the plaintiffs only if no 
reasonable minds could differ on the answer. 
Utah law is clear that in order for a grade crossing to be 
more than ordinarily hazardous, 
there must be something in the configuration of 
the land, or in the construction of the railroad, 
or in the structures in the vicinity, or in the 
nature or amount of the travel on the highway, or 
in other conditions, which renders the warning 
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employed at the crossings inadequate to warn the 
public of danger. 
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739. In other words, a fact finder must 
determine from all the facts and circumstances whether the 
warnings employed at the crossing adequately warn the public of 
danger. 
In this case, several conditions exist that could warrant a 
jury finding that the warnings employed at the crossing were not 
sufficient to warn the public of danger. The tracks cross the 
road at an acute angle so that a driver would have to be aware of 
a train overtaking him from the rear; the train approaches from 
behind at almost twice the speed of the car; a building blocks a 
driver's view for a short period of time as the driver approaches 
the grade crossing; the location of the warning signs, when 
combined with the acute angle of the crossing, makes it possible 
to stop behind the signs yet still be on the tracks; the second 
train that crossed on the second track immediately before the 
accident was near enough to the first set of tracks to cause 
confusion; and the approach to the grade crossing was snow packed 
-and slippery. In addition, the stop sign was 18 inches lower 
than the height specified in the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices. The court cannot conclude that all reasonable 
minds, when presented with all the facts and circumstances of 
this particular crossing, would find that the crossbuck and a 
nonconforming stop sign were sufficient to warn the public of 
danger. 
The defendant asserts that the test should be whether a 
driver who exercises reasonable care would see the train. See 
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Brown v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co., 248 Ore. 110, 
431 P.2d 817, 821 (1967). However, that is not the test the Utah 
courts have applied. The Utah court has consistently focused on 
the conditions at the crossing that may or may not make the 
statutory warnings ineffective. This court can see no reason to 
change that focus. 
The defendant also asserts that a driver who stopped before 
entering the grade crossing would have an unobstructed view of 
the tracks, and therefore the crossing cannot possibly be more 
than ordinarily hazardous. See Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper 
Co., 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1185 (1973). The difficulty 
with this argument is that it assumes the driver has sufficient 
warning to stop before reaching the crossing. If the warning is 
sufficient, the crossing is, as a matter of law, no more 
hazardous than ordinarily hazardous, and a zone of safety is not 
relevant. On the other hand, if the warning is not sufficient, a 
zone of safety a few feet from the tracks will not be available 
because a driver would not be warned in time to take advantage of 
it. Accordingly, the defendant's contention has no merit. 
Finally, the defendant asserts that conditions affecting 
visibility do not render a crossing more than ordinarily 
hazardous unless they are created by the railroad itself. In 
support of that position, the defendant relies on Benson v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 
790 (1955). This court disagrees. First, Bridges discusses 
conditions, such as the lay of the land and structures in the 
vicinity, that are not affected by the railroad. Second, only 
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one justice concurred in the opinion in Bengon. Three other 
justices concurred only in the result. This court believes that 
the Utah Supreme Court would rule that conditions at a grade 
crossing can render statutory warnings inadequate even if the 
railroad itself did not create those conditions. 
III. 
The defendant's final claim for partial summary judgment is 
that Garth Wilde, the driver of the automobile, was negligent as 
a matter of law. The court can find Wilde negligent as a matter 
of law only if all reasonable minds would arrive at the 
conclusion that Wilde "failed to use the degree of care which an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would have observed for 
his own safety under the circumstances." Benson, 286 P.2d at 
792. Utah law defines the term "ordinary care under the 
circumstances" in a case involving a collision at a grade 
crossing: 
In the absence of any special hazards or 
conditions of danger, the well-established rule 
in respect to the duty of travelers approaching 
railroad crossings in this state is that the 
traveler is required to look and listen, and if 
necessary to stop to avoid being injured by 
approaching trains. 
In this case, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law 
that all reasonable minds would agree that Wilde breached this 
duty. For the purpose of this part of the motion, the court must 
assume that the grade crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous. Accordingly the court must also assume that the 
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warnings that existed at the crossing were inadequate to warn 
Wilde that he was approaching a grade crossing. It cannot be 
said as a matter of law that a driver is negligent for failing to 
heed inadequate warnings. A traveler approaching a grade 
crossing has no special duty to look and listen, and if necessary 
to stop, unless he is first warned that he is approaching a grade 
crossing. 
The defendant argues at length that all reasonable minds 
would agree that a reasonable person would stop at a stop sign.9 
However, the defendant virtually ignores the fact that the sign 
was 18 inches lower than the height specified in the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices. It cannot be said that all 
reasonable minds would agree that a driver exercising reasonable 
care would see a nonconforming stop sign in time to stop. The 
court is not willing to conclude that Wilde's delay in stopping 
was attributable to his own negligence rather than to the 
nonconformity of the stop sign. Based on an examination of all 
the circumstances, the court believes that the question of 
whether Garth Wilde breached his duty of care is a question of 
fact for the jury. 
9 The defendant does not argue that Wilde Was negligent per 
se. Indeed, the defendant admits that it "has never contended in 
any of its memoranda or arguments, that the doctrine of 
negligence per se is applicable in this case." Supplemental 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, p. 7, filed July 17, 1984. 
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IV. 
In conclusion, the court would be remiss if it did not 
express its criticism of the doctrine of the "more than 
ordinarily hazardous" crossing. The Utah Supreme Court should, 
at its first opportunity, examine the doctrine with an eye to 
eliminating it. The court believes that instructing a fact 
finder that it cannot find a railroad negligent for operating a 
train through a crossing without taking additional precautions 
unless it first finds that the warnings at the crossing were 
inadequate to warn the public adds nothing -- except perhaps 
confusion -- to an instruction that the railroad has a duty to 
operate its trains with reasonable care. If the warnings are 
adequate, a jury would find that a reasonable person would not 
add additional warnings. A special doctrine is not necessary. 
The railroads1 concern that juries would award damages when 
there is no evidence that the warnings were inadequate is 
unwarranted. The trial court has an obligation to instruct the 
jury on theories supported by evidence. If all reasonable minds 
would agree that, based on the evidence, the warnings were 
sufficient, the trial court would not submit an instruction 
allowing the jury to find a breach of the railroad's duty for 
failing to take additional precautions. 
In this case, however, the court holds that the "more than 
ordinarily hazardous" crossing doctrine still exists in Utah. The 
doctrine does not impose a duty on a railroad to erect additional 
warnings at a crossing that is more than ordinarily dangerous. 
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It merely authorizes a jury to find a railroad negligent for 
failing to take additional precautions only if it first 
determines whether the conditions at the crossing rendered the 
warnings employed there inadequate to warn the public of danger. 
In this case, the court finds that whether the warnings were 
adequate is a disputed question of fact. The court also finds 
that whether Garth Wilde was negligent is also a disputed 
question of fact. 
The defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. 
Dated this A. 
es mailed to counsel 4/3/85: nw 
len K. Young, Esq, 
>rry L. Spence, Esq. 
Scott Savage, Esq. 
d ay o f *>n™ i , 1985 
BY THE COURT 
--B&LJCExS 
UNITEDVSTAtfES DISTRICT JUDGE 
